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[L. A. Nos. 23024, 23025. In Bank.

Dee. 3, 1954.J

ARCHIE B. SHOHE, Respondent, v. ALBERTA MAE
SHORE, Appellant.
(Two Cases.)
[1 ] Maniage-Annulment - Hearing and Determlnation.-When

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5J

[6]

property rights of parties are properly put in issue by plead·
ings in annulment action, court may determine them.
rd. - Incidents of Void and Voidable Marriages - Property
Rights.-If purported marriage was not entered into in good
faith, court may not properly award property of parties as if
marriage had been valid and property community in character.
Id.-Annulment--Decree.-Decision of court in annulment
action awarding annulment to wife on ground that husband
had another spouse living at time of his purported marriage to
her and deciding that, because parties were itt pari delicto,
it lacks jurisdiction to make any award of property alleged
to be community in character, is tantamount to dismissal of
respective claims of parties with respect to their property
interests.
Judgments-Res Judlcat&-Dismissal.-When decision on jurisdictional question is based on determination of merits of an
issue before court, it constitutes a binding determination of
that issue.
Marriage-Incidents of Void and Voidable Marriages-Property Rights.-Fact that man and woman do not in good faith
believe they are married does not preclude court from protecting their respective interests in jointly acquired property.
Id. - Annulment - Decree - Conclusivenesa.-Regardless of
whether or not husband in annulment action sought to establish
his interest in jointly acquired property on theory of claim to
one-half interest therein without reference to purported
marital relationship, his subsequent action to establish his
interest on that theory is barred by adjudication in annulment
action awarding annulment to wife and refusing to make any
disposition of property OD ground that parties were in pari

[2J Rights and remedies in respect of property accumulated
by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under
void marriage, note, 31 A.L.R.2d 1255. See also Cal.Jur., Marriage, § 21; Am.Jur., Marriage, § 50 et seq.
[4J See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 185; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 208.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3,6] Marriage, § 44; (2,5J Marriage,
§22; [4] Judf,rments, §353(1); [7] Judgments, §360; [8] Judgments, §§ 395, 396.
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dr/ir/o 111 n".;pl·l~t. to t.hf'ir purport,!d IIl11rringt', sinel' dcrisilJlI

in Kur.h IIction \\'I'llt to merits of pnrported hn!lhnnd's claim to
right to intprC'st in propC'rty.
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.-A judgment
in action between same parties on identical cause of ot'tion
is res judicata and a bar to second suit thereon, not only as
to issues actually determined therein hut also as to issue!l
necessarily involved.
[8] Id.-Res Judicata - Matters Concluded.-Though causes of
action be different, prior detC'rmination of issue is eonclusive
in subsequent suit between same parties as to that issue and
every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat
its determination.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Kern
County. William L. Bradshaw. Judge. Reversed.
Actions to establish title to undivided oue-half interest in
real and personal property in possession of defendant, and
for partition of personal property. Judgments for plaintiff
reversed.
Siemon & Siemon and Alfred Siemon for Appellant.
Kendall & Howell and William A. Howell for Respondent.
'l'RA YNOR, J .-Archie B. Shore brought these actions to
establish his title to an undivided one-half interest in certain
real and personal property in the possession of defendant
Alberta Mae Shore and to secure a partition of the personal
property. The actions were consvlidated for trial. in her
answers, Alberta pleaded that Archie's actions were barred
by a decree of annulment between the parties and that Archie
had given her his one-half interest in the property while
they were living together as husband and wife. Title to all
of the property had originally been taken by the parties as
joint tenants. The trial court found that the annulment
decree was not a bar to these actions and that Archie had
not made a gift of his interest in the property to Alberta.
It further found that Archie had deeded his interest in
the real property to defendant to protect his interest from
unfounded claims against him by third parties and that
Alberta held Archie's interest on an oral trust for him.
Since a confidential relationship had existed between the
parties and since the claims against Archie wel'e unfounded,
it concluded that the oral trust was enforceable and entered
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that each party was the owner of an undh'idcd
ol\r-half interest in the real propcrty. In the action for
partition of the personal property it entered judgment that
('8t'h of the partiE's was the owner of an undivided one-half
inten'st and ordered a partition. Alberta has appealed from
both judgments.
Relying on the following facts, Alberta contends that the
trial court erred in holding that the decree in the annulment action was not a bar to these actions. At the time of
the annulment action in 1951, title to the real property
stood in her name and she was in possession of both the
real and personal property. In her complaint for divorce
or annulment she alleged that the property involved in this
action was her separate property and prayed that the court
so determine. In his answer and cross-complaint for annul.
ment, Archie alleged that the property was the community
or jointly acquired property of the parties and prayed that
it be divided equally between them. The trial court awarded
an annulment to Alberta on the ground that Archie had
another spouse living at the time of his purported marriage
to Alberta. It also found that the parties were in pari
delicto, and "that the Court, therefore. makes no findings
concerning the character of the property set out in the first
cause of action of [Alberta's] complaint." As a conclusion
of law it stated ., That the Court, finding both parties at
fault in the purported marriage, declines for lack of jurisdiction to make any award of property alleged to be com·
munity in character."
Alberta contends that the foregoing finding and conclusion constitute a binding adjudication that at the time of
the annulment neither party was entitled to relief against
the other with respect to the property here in question.
Archie contends, on the other hand, that a denial of relief
for lack of jurisdiction does not constitute a judgment on
the merits and that in any event no adjudication with respect to the property was carried into the formal decree
of annulment.
[1] When the property rights of the parties are properly
put ill issue by the pleadings in an annulment action. the
court llIay determine them. (Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal.
354. :1&7 I ~!l:; P. !l391 ; .QclUlp.;der v. •"'Icltneider, 183 Cal. 335,
342 lHJl P. 533, 11 A.hR. 13861; s(!e 8allfluinetli v. Sanfluilll'ffi, !) C'a1.2rl 95, 99 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342].}
[2] If the purported marriage was not entered into in
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good faith, however, the court may not properly award the
property of the parties as if the marriage had been valict
and the property community in character. (Vallera v. Val.
lera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 684-685 [134 P.2d 761) ; Baskett v. Crook.
86 Cal.App.2d 355, 362 [195 P.2d 39] ; Taylor v. Taylor, 66
Cal.App.2d 390, 399 [152 P.2d 480}.) [3] When the decision of the court in the annulment action is viewed in
the light of these rules, it is elear that it constituted more
than a decision on the issue of jurisdiction. It was also a
determination on the merits of Archie's claim that the property should be divided equally as the community or jointly
acquired property of the parties. The court did not merely
decide that it lacked jurisdiction to award the property, it
decided that because the parties were in pari delicto neither
of them was entitled to legal assistance with respect to their
property interests. Accordingly, when the decree of annulment is interpreted in the light of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law (see City of Vernon v. Superior Court,
38 Ca1.2d 509, 514 [241 P.2d 243]; Gelfand v. O'Haver,
33 Ca1.2d 218, 222 [200 P.2d 790)} , it is clear that it was
tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the
parties with respect to their property interests. The situation is thus clo!lely analogous to that in Olwell v. Hopkins,
28 Cal.2d 147' [168 P.2d 972], where it was held that a
judgment of dismissal was res judicata when it appeared
that the dismissal was based upon a determination that the
contract sued upon was void. The court recognized that
"Ordinarily a judgment of dismissal is not a judgment on
the merits and therefore does not operate as a bar to another
action on the same cause of action. This court has recognized, however, that a dismissal may follow an actual determination on the merits [citations] as have courts in other
jurisdictions.••. At the hearing upon their motion to dismiss the present action, defendants introduced in evidence
the record of the first action. It is clear from that record
that the one issue passed upon by the trial court in dismissing
the first action wa.~ that raised by defendants' contention
that plaintiff's cause of action was based upon a contract
that was void. The defense thus interposed went to the
merits of plaintiffs' cause of action. . . . [Defendants] raised
an issue as to plaintiffs' right to recover under any eircumstanc('!; IIpon their al\fOged ('uuse of action and upon
that issue the COUl't r(,lld('\'t'cl jmlgm('nt against plaintiffs."
(28 Ca1.2d at 149-150.) [4] The rc~oning in the Olwell
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I'm;.- i~ {·qually ;ll'l'li"al>ll' h,·"C', IUlil a"{'ol'/lillgly w,, I~ondud('
that although a jlldg1l1l'nt refusing to Il~tl'rmille an issue
on the ground of 1111'1. of jurisdil'tion is not ordinarily res
judicata (STaker v. JfcConnick·Saeltzer Co., 179 Cal. 387,
389 [177 P. 155]; see also Stark v, Coker, 20 CaUd 839,
843·);;44 [129 P.2d 390]), when the decision on the jurisdic·
tional question is based upon a determination of the merits
of an issue before the court, it constitutes a binding determination of that issue,
In the present actions Archie is not seeking to establish
an interest in the property growing out of tce purported
marital relationship. He relies on evidence with respect
to the acquisition of the property and the parties' dealings
therewith that the trial court fOlmd to be sufficient to establish his claim to a one-half interest without reference to
that relationship. [5] As was pointed out in Vallera v.
Vall era, supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 685, the fact that a man and
woman do not in good faith believe they are married does
not preelude the court from protecting their respective interests in jointly acquired property. Accordingly if Archie
advanced the theory of recovery he now relies upon in the
annulment action, the court erred in holding that the fact
the parties were in pari delicto prevented relief. [6] AI.
though it does not appear that Archie sought to establish
his interest in the property in the annulment action on the
theory now advanced, whether he did or not, these actions
are barred by that adjudication. He now seeks to establish
the same, right in the property that he sought to establish
in the annulment action, and the decision in that action
went to the merits of his claim. If the court in the
annulment action erroneously applied the doctrine of pan
deUcto to deny relief on the theory now advanced, Archie's
remedy was by appeal. On the other hand, if Archie failed
to present the present theory of recovery in the former
action, it is too late for him to do so now. The situation
is legally indistinguishable from that in Krier v. Krier, 28
Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d 681], where a wife sought in successive actions to ectablish an interest in the same property on
di1ierent legal theories. "In the prior separate maintenance
action Mrs. Krier sought and procured an adjudication with
respect to her interest in the property. She here seeks a
second adjl111ic·ation relative to her interest in the same
property. [7] It is settled, however, that a jUdgment in
a prior a<:tion betw~en the same parties on the identical
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judicata. and a hllr to a secon!! suit
.\"t!'1"lllitll'd tlu'rl'jll
but al~o a.c; to' iSSlll'!; 1H'('('s~:t rily j;1VolvNl. I Citat inns. J
[8] And even though tht' eanse of action be different. thE'
prior determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsl"quent
suit between the same parties as to that issue and ('wry
matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its
determination. [Citations. J
"Having claimed th(' property in the prior action solely
as community property and having procured a d('cree
therein based on its character as such, Mrs. Krier is pre·
eluded from seeking in this later action another award
thereof based on an entirely different interest (holDestead
or otherwise) existing, but unclaimed, at th(' time of th('
earlier adjudication. Under the circumstances she was required to advance her entire interest, whether community
or homestead, or both, in order to permit the court to mak('
an effective and complete acijudication of the respectiv('
interests of the parties. [Citation.] Not having done so,
she cannot relitigate the matter, whether it be held that the
two suits involved the same cause of action insofar as they
concerned her interest in the property, or ~erely involved
a common issue as to her interest in the property." (28
Ca1.2d at 843-844,)
The judgments are reversed.
f'lll1SP.

of Ilction is
not onlv

S !TORE

1I11'1'flOII

r('11
IU;

to j~I';IWI-; :1l'tlll1l1y

Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent.
I do not agree that the finding of the trial court in the
annulment action bronght by Alberta to the effect that "the
Court, therefore, makes no findings concerning the character
of the property set out in the first cause of action of [Alberta's] complaint" and the conclusion of law that "the
Court, finding both parties at fault in the purported marriage, declines for lack of jurisdiction to make any award
of property alleged to be community in character," con·
stituted a binding determination of the property issue so as
to constitute a bar to the present actions. It was, in my
opinion, a specific declaration that the issue had not been
adjudicated.
"There can be no doubt that the dismissal of an action
or denial of relief for want of jurisdiction is not a judgment
on the merits, and cannot prevent the plaintiff from Bub·
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seqllcntly prosecuting his action in any Conrt anthoriz('d
to cntertain and detE'rmine it. No question otlll'r than the'
jurisdit:tional one is concluded by such a judgment, silJ('e
after the Court has determined its lack of jurisdiction, filly
further finding or judgment as to the matters alleged is wQoll~'
ineffective. . . . Refusal to pass on a particular matter for
lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of it." (Freeman
on Judgments. 5th ed., vol. 2, p. 1546. § 733. (In Slaki·r ".
McOormick-Saeltzer 00., 179 Cal. 387. 389 fI77 P. 155]. this
court said: "Looking merely to the judgment in the foreclosure suit, it is very plain that the court did not therein
undertake to pass upon the merits of the contro.ersy between
Slaker and the McCormick-Saeltzer Compan~'. What it did
?vas to decline to determine that controversy, for the reason
that it was without jurisdiction, in that action, so to do.
Whether the holdina that it had no jurisdiction was sound
or erroneous is not a question for consideration here. Tit/!
essential point is that there was no adjudication of t11e
merits . ... " (Emphasis added ..) It is elemental that 8
judgment which has not been rendered on the merits is not
res judicata (Oampanella v. Oampanella, 204 Cal. 515 [269
P. 433); Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. 00., 14
Ca1.2d 47, 52 [92 P.2d 804] ; Gonsalves v. Bank of America.
16 Ca1.2d 169, 173 [105 P.2d 118]: Everts v. Blaschko, 17
Cal.App.2d 188 [61 P.2d 776] ; Matteson v. Klump, 100 Cal.
App. 64 [279 P. 669] ; Helvey v.Oastles, 73 Cal.App.2d 60';'
[167 P.2d 4921; .Jacobs v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc ..
4 Cal.App.2d 1 [40 P.2d 899]; Miller v. Ambassador Par!.
Syndicate, 121 Cal.App. 92 [9 P.2d 267] ; Taylor v. Darlil1U.
22 Cal.App. 101 [133 P. 503]; Security T. & S. Bank v.
Southern Pac. 00., 214 Cal. 81 [3 P.2d 1015] ; Scheeline "
Moshier, 172 Cal. 565 r158 P. 222]).
What the majority is saying is, in effect, this: When tlw
trial court determined it had no jurisdiction to decide the
question of property, it was really a determination on th('
merits that neither party was entitled to relief and therefor!'
"tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the
parties with respect to their property interests." The trial
court spe!'ifically made no finding as to the character of the
property. A!'. in t.he SlakeI' case, it declined to determin!'
t.he controversy for the reason that it felt it wa.~ without
jurisdiction. "Whether the hoMing that it had no jurisdiction was SOUIlIl or crroneous is not a question for consideration
here. The essential point is that there was no adjudieation
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the merits.
"In order to reach the conclusion reached
by the majority, too many "ifs" are involved. First it i~
8aid "if Archie advanced the theory of recovery" now relif'd
on, the court erred in holding that the doctrine of pari delicto
prevented relief. Then that "if" is discarded with the
statement that "it does not appear that Archie" did seek to
establish his interest on the theory now advanced. Secondly.
it is said "if the court in the annulment action erroneously
applied the doctrine of pari delicto to deny relief on the
theory now advanced, Archie's remedy was by appeal."
Then it is said: "On the other hand, if Archie failed to
present the present theory of recovery in the former action,
it is too late for him to do so now." The rule set forth in
Krier v. Krier, 28 Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d 681], is not applicable
here. When a court specifically declines to pass upon an issue,
the rule as to issues involved directly, or necessarily involved
by implication, does not apply.
Before the trial court could reach any conclusion with respect to the respective property interests involved, it had
first to determine the character of the property. This it did
not do. That no determination was in fact made is borne
out by the language used in the conclusion of law wherein
comment is made concerning the "alleged" commnnity cbaracter of the property. As we said in Stark v. Coker, 20 Ca1.2d
839, 840, 843 [129 P.2d 390J. "While it is true that as a
general rule a judgment is a bar as res judicata not only as
to a subsequent action on the same matter actually determined,
but also as to all issues that might have been litigated as
incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter
of the litigation and every matter coming within its legitimate
purview (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1908, 1911; 15 Cal.Jur. 142
et seq.), it is also true that that only is adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have been adjudged
or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1911.) And when it
affirmatively appears that an issue was fIOt determined by
the judgment, it obviously is not res judicata upon that issue.
A judgment is not an adjudication as to matters which thl!
court e:epressly refrains from determining. (Watson v. Poore,
18 Ca1.2d 302 [115 P.2d 4781; 15 Ca1.Jnr. 150.)" (Emphasis
added.)
If we were not faced with the specific finding that no df"
termination was made as to the character of the property.
the position taken in the majority opinion might be entitled
011
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to more cre"ibjlit.~·. 'I'he rule I hfLV~ just set forth ilS sfatf'lI
in the SIak.,!" ,'ase is I·",~ognized hy the majority. hilI 11I'l'pr
theless, the conclusion is reached that since the deeisioll of 1 hl'
trial court on the jurisdictiollal question was based upon a
determination of the merits" of an issue before the court. it
constitutes a binding determination of that issue." It seem!;
to me to be ineseapable that before the trial court could mnk!'
a binding determination of the property issue based on th!'
merits, it must, first, determine whether it had jurisdiction
to make such determination, but it expressly held that it baei
no jurisdiction to determine such issue and refused to determine it.
It is my view that the majority opinion is clearly in conflict with the rule set forth in Freeman on Judgments (supra)
and Slaker v. McOormick-Saeltzer 00., supra, as well as
Stark v. Ooker, supra. The rule announced in the majority
opinion extends the doctrine of res judicata beyond its intended scope in that a majority of this court there concludes,
in the face of a clear statement by the trial court to the
contrary, that an issue was finally determined so as to constitute a bar to a second action. The logical result of the
conclusion reached by the majority is to deprive the plaintiff
in such an action of his day in court.
I would affirm the judgments.

)

Shenk, J. t and Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 29, 1954. Sh!'nk .•1., Carter .•T., ann Schauer, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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